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Liberté, Égalité, Sororité: How Care Ethics Informs Social Justice
Virginia Held has claimed that “there can be care without justice” but “there can be no
justice without care.” Alternatively, bell hooks has suggested that there can be “no love without
justice.” What is the relationship between justice and care? Does justice need an emotive,
particularist, contextual aspect or is it fundamentally a universal and abstract concept?
Care ethics, as contemporary feminists have defined it, is only a quarter of a century old.
When theorists were first struggling to distinguish this new ethical approach, some chose to
sharply differentiate it from theories of justice. Now that care ethics has matured as a field,
theorists no longer pit care and justice as purely oppositional, giving rise to new questions about
how the two moral concepts relate to one another. As Annette Baier writes, “justice is a social
value of very great importance, and injustice is an evil [however] other things matter [in moral
theory] besides justice.”i One of those things is care.
One can only do so much in a short paper. Elsewhere I have claimed that care is
foundational: all morality, including justice, emerges from our ability to care; although care is
clearly an overlooked aspect of human existence. Accordingly, I do not see care and justice as
antithetical or alternative theories but that attending to care has the potential to enrich our ideas
about justice. In this paper, I suggest that care provides at least 3 important dimensions to
justice: a motivational foundation for justice, an enlarged human ontology, and corrective to the
temptation of gamesmanship.
I begin by discussing the nature of care ethics, then I turn to Rawlsian justice and address
what care uniquely contributes social justice.
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Care Ethics
Care ethics is the youngest of the Western moral approaches. The term was first coined
in 1982 making it a little over a quarter century old. By comparison, utilitarianism is a couple of
hundred years old, virtue ethics is maybe 2500 years old and deontological ethics is at least 4000
years old. My point is that care theory is still in its nascent development stage and its contours
are still being negotiated. Theorists continue to argue over how to categorize and define care
ethics.
Early formulations of care emphasized gender, personal relationships, and the paradigm
of parental caring. The early work of Nel Noddings, Sara Ruddick and others perpetuated the
personal dimension of care. More recently there have been efforts to theorize about socializing
care
So what is care? In a recent book, feminist philosopher Virginia Held, after explaining
that there is not yet agreement about care describes it as both “a practice and a value. As a
practice it shows us how to respond to needs and why we should. It builds trust and mutual
concern.”ii She also claims that care and caring relations need to be further valued in our society.
Joan Tronto describes care ethics as a practice that endeavors to maintain, continue, and repair
the world.iii
In my view, care refocuses ethical content away from adjudication to consider the
process, context, and affects of behavior. Care is a relational approach to morality born out of the
notion that human beings are not simply independent rational agents. Care ethicists begin with
the premise that humans are fundamentally social beings enmeshed in a web of relationships.
Any action of moral significance takes place in a particular context that includes and impacts
many other beings. Accordingly, care ethics favors concrete considerations over abstract ones.
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Understanding the real people and implications involved in any situation is crucial to care. The
moral agent is not simply an ambiguous other but a flesh and blood human being to which we
have a connection despite significant differences of culture, class, or gender. Empathy and
compassion are valued over hypothetical applications of moral reasoning.
In the book, Embodied Care, I argue that care ethics is not an alternative moral theory
particularly when it comes to adjudication. It represents a reframing of morality that does not
negate principles or consequences but suffuses those approaches with a fundamental concern for
relationships and particularity. In many ways, care ethics does a different kind of work than
many other ethical approaches. It does not provide a rubric for determining moral action in the
abstract, but it does offer guidance as a situation unfolds or becomes more concrete. For those
steeped in purely abstract ethical thinking this can be very frustrating because care does not offer
the same clarity at the abstract level that other forms of ethics do. As philosopher Susan Hekman
describes, care ethics is part of a modern intellectual “sea change” that is moving away from
absolutism and universalism toward particularism and concreteness. The starting point for
particularism and concreteness is experience.
Care ethicists often find themselves reconsidering the place of emotions in morality.
Feelings are an outgrowth of beings who imaginatively consider the position of particular other
beings in relation to themselves. This is not to assume that one can “own” someone else’s
experiences, however despite vast differences there is always room for some degree of
understanding. By extension, knowledge is viewed not as simply an amalgamation of facts and
propositions but as potentially disruptive to the routines of our lives when we care.
Understanding one another leads to sympathetic connections that have the potential to draw us to
act on behalf of others. Care theory, then, addresses both the nature of ethics and the nature of
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knowledge.
Ultimately, why is care ethics so hard to define? Perhaps my idiosyncratic approach to
care ethics that grounds it in the body helps explain. I believe the reason there is so much
difficulty in defining care ethics and yet so many people find it compelling is that it is an
understanding that is in part embodied. Humans learn to care not in an abstract way but in very
concrete ways from others through proximal examples. We experience care directly, through
the body, learn it, capture it, and then extend it to others. Furthermore, care is also implicitly
learned rather than explicitly articulated. People generally do not stop and announce that they
are going to teach care to someone. Care is given in subtle and complex ways. Applying the
work of Merleau-Ponty, I contend that our bodies catch and learn behaviors of care and then
extend them to others. This is a discussion for another time but this explains to you my bias
when it comes to care and why it is not easily or simply articulated.

Care, Justice, and Gender
The early work on care ethics was unfortunately often interpreted to generate some
binary positions. Most importantly was the notion that Care = feminine ethics and justice =
masculine ethics. In 1982 Carol Gilligan performed the crucial feminist function of naming the
previously unnamed, but as with all new ideas, defining required describing as much what care is
not as what it is. Gilligan’s early thinking focused on the idea that care was not justice. Other
theorists and commentators picked up on this idea. Given Western proclivities toward binary
oppositions, care and justice were posed as mutually exclusive and the dichotomy mapped nicely
onto ideas of masculinity and femininity being opposites. Over time, feminist theorizing
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regarding care ethics, including that of Gilligan, moved away from dichotomous thinking with a
number of theorists attempting to reconcile care with justice.
Care’s relationship with gender is complex. The alternative voice of care emerges out of
women’s experience. Women have historically been the caregivers and therefore have thought
about it, lived it, and embodied it. However, care, as an approach to morality does not hinge on
gender. There is nothing in the scholarly reflection on care that establishes a gendered
prerequisite.
Unfortunately, the notion that care and justice are mutually exclusive has persisted in the
minds of some as witnessed in contemporary textbooks of ethics.
Nevertheless, care ethics remains one of the most dynamic aspects of feminist theorizing
with new works being published all the time.

Care and Rawlsian Social Justice
No one can discuss contemporary social justice theory with addressing the work of John
Rawls. I will make my summary brief here as I imagine this audience is quite well versed in
Rawlsian theory. Rawls conceives of justice as fairness and to achieve fairness he offers two
principles: the liberty principle and the difference principle. To achieve a perspective of
fairness, Rawls constructs a fictional “original position” of ignorance from which no one knows
their relative strengths and weaknesses and thus cannot speculate as to personal advantage.
From this veil of ignorance, according Rawls, one logically draws his two principles of fairness.
The first principle addresses equality. Because relative social advantages are unknown, everyone
has an equal right to basic liberties such as freedom to vote, run for office, speech, thought, and,
negatively, from arbitrary arrest. In isolation, the first principle is both simple and radical in its
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call for equality. Rawls’ second principle of justice is more utilitarian. This principle allows for
the abrogation of perfect equality but only when such inequalities benefit the least advantaged of
society and their remains fair opportunities to obtain jobs. Accordingly, a physician may have
disproportionately large access to social resources because she will contribute to the well being
of the poor in ways that would not be possible if everyone had equal access to social resources.
Susan Moller Okin provides one of the most thorough feminist criticisms of Rawls’
approach. Okin finds a widespread absence of women in Rawls’ language. Although Rawls’
theory of justice would ostensibly seek fairness for women as well as men, Okin demonstrates its
inherent masculinist bias. For example, Rawls repeatedly refers to justice coming to heads of
households in an attempt to account for non economic relations in society. While there is an
admirable aspect to this sentiment, Rawls is implicitly discounting gender relations within the
family unit as an issue for justice and he is reinforcing traditional notions of separate spheres. In
addition, we continue to live in a society where “head of household” is often heard male.
Perhaps more importantly and yet related to the gender analysis, is Okin’s concern that the
individuals in Rawls’ original position are mutually disinterested.iv
Rawls theory of justice is rational, fair, and highly compelling. However, it is an abstract
construct. Notions such as “original position” “veil of ignorance” and “fairness” are fictions.
Compelling fictions but fictions nonetheless. They are intended to appeal to reason. In
particular they are intended to appeal to the rational self interest of individual moral agents.
Okin’s analysis of Rawls connects well to care ethics. Nel Noddings finds Rawls’s entire project
well-intended but misguided in its emphasis on rationality of a certain sort. Rawls writes of a
“rational plan of life” to which Noddings retorts, “Historically, who has come close to doing
this?”v Noddings responds that Western White educated males have come the closest and even
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then not in any consistent manner. She advocates giving up the idea of life as a rational plan.
Her approach to finding justice in society is to begin with the experience of the best homes and
extrapolate from there. Beginning with concrete moral experiences and thematizing from those.
Accordingly, I will offer three areas where I believe care has an important contribution to make
to theorizing about justice.

What Care Contributes
1. A Foundation for a justice motivation
Here I will address how care is both a personal foundation for justice and a social foundation
for justice. Noddings claims that we cannot develop a theory of justice “without first
developing a social theory of care.”vi Care for the other and ourselves motivates justice. My
imaginative understanding and empathy for the other makes them a real possibility and
instantiates their agency for me. I understand what it feels like to be slighted and mistreated
and when I can see the other as myself or an extension of myself, I want justice for them.
Rather than self-interest as the motivator for justice, self-understanding is the motivator
according to a care approach. The civil rights movement was a struggle for social justice
between those in power and oppressed people. While there was a legal and political battle
for rights, there was also an affective struggle to view African-Americans as fully human
capable of feeling the pain of injustice as well as the joy of freedom. When the other is
conceived as wholly different the discontinuity makes caring difficult and the desire to bring
justice less compelling.
Care, as a personal basis for pursuing justice is a theme that repeats itself over and over
again in human experience. For example, Ida B. Wells (1862-1931) was the greatest of all
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crusaders against lynching. Her campaign was one that explicitly couched her work as social
justice. Wells used evidence from police reports to demonstrate that lynchings were carried
out arbitrarily, usually without any crime whatsoever as a basis—a violation of fairness. She
repeatedly invoked the language of justice even in the title of her autobiography, Crusader
for Justice. What initiated Wells into this crusade? In 1889, three of her friends were
wrongfully convicted and subsequently hung in Memphis. She had a connection. She cared
about these individuals and their plight—an affective experience. Wells reflected on this
experience and extrapolated that sympathetic understanding to others who she did not know.
Subsequently, Wells had what has been described as a “passion for justice.” Note that term.
Justice, for example in the Rawlsian sense, is an abstraction but when founded in personal
connection it can be passionately pursued. At least a perception of caring is involved.
Some have suggested that caring should be the motivation and criteria for social policy.
In his recent book, The Ethics of Care and Empathy, Michael Slote applies his understanding
of empathetic caring to social institutions and policy. His version of care ethics is squarely
centered on a rich understanding of empathy. Previously, Slote contended that care is a form
of virtue ethics, a view that he has not altered but his later work has increasingly placed care
at the forefront of ethical theory. Slote suggests that we can assess the justice of laws and
policies by whether they reflect care: “an ethics of empathetic caring can say that institutions
and laws, as well as social customs and practices, are just if they reflect empathetically caring
motivation on the part of (enough of) those responsible for originating and maintain them.”vii
Although I am not comfortable with Slote’s emphasis on care as a theory of adjudication, I
find his notion that care be valued in the development of social morality attractive.
My first point might be described as attending to the psychology of justice through care.
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2. A Challenge to Who We Are: An Enlarged Human Ontology
Traditional forms of justice treat humans as wholly individual agents capable of moral
agency. There is truth to this as humans make decisions with ethical implications all the
time. Yet, individual agency does not tell the whole story. Humans are also fundamentally
social beings enmeshed in webs of relationships that deeply impact our ethical choices. As
Annette Baeir describes, we are all second persons. We exist in the tension between an
individual identity and a social constitution. To ignore either element is to posit an
incomplete human ontology. Justice as it is normally constructed addresses individual
considerations such as rights. Here, Okin’s critique of Rawls is relevant. Rawls assumes
atomistic rather than interdependent and engaged individuals. Assumptions about
individualistic human nature is built into many theories of justice which are difficult to
challenge particularly from within the culture of the ruggedly individualistic United States
and its dominant economic form that continually reinforces individualism. Entailed in the
story of individualism is the idea of self-sufficiency. In psychological terms, an internal
locus of control over one’s life. In reality, humans are more vulnerable than that. Everyone
goes through being cared for in their lives at one time or another.
Related to this understanding of individuals, is the question of what constitutes
autonomy. This is a fascinating subject that time will not allow a discussion of here, but
autonomy has been a very important subject in Western theorizing because its ethics has
emphasized individual morality for so long. An enlarged notion of autonomy, or as Grace
Clement and Slote describe, a relational autonomy, might be an important prerequisite for a
robust sense of social justice.
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3. Application: A corrective to gamesmanship
The fairest system of justice that does not account for the circumstances of its constituency is
fraught with danger. One circumstance is the inconsistent applications or understanding of
ethical ideals. Even if a system of justice is constructed with the best of intentions, those
who apply it may not use the same spirit. For example, African American males were
granted the vote at the federal level in 1865 with the ratification of the 13th amendment.
Soon thereafter, Jim Crow laws including literacy tests and diploma requirements began to
appear that placed education restriction on who could vote. Ostensibly, such laws followed
the letter of the law as they did not name African Americans for exclusion, but in their
application they served to discriminate. Justice, in the form of laws, was manipulated. Here
the nature of human rights is addressed. Do rights exist when an authoritative body
promulgates them or when they are widely actualized? The gap between existence and
actualization can grow when rights are imposed and enforced externally but do not represent
an internalized change amongst the constituency.
Socially applied care ethics is very demanding, and perhaps slow, akin to the nature of
deliberative democracy but perhaps more resistant to legalistic gamesmanship. If an
atmosphere of authentic care for the well being of African Americans had accompanied
changes in suffrage laws, such gamesmanship would have been less likely. In this case, care
makes the notion of justice more robust and open to manipulation. Part time philosopher,
Mark Twain captures this notion in the late 19th century novel, Huckleberry Finn. The
protagonist is morally torn when confronted with the opportunity to help Jim, a runaway
slave escape. Everything he has been told about justice indicates that helping Jim is wrong.
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Jim is someone else’s property and helping him escape would be stealing. The argument is
rational but the premise is wrong. However, Huckleberry Finn does not come to the
conclusion of helping Jim through rational argument but rather because of their time
together, he has come to care about Jim. In Twain’s insightful characterization, care
provides a corrective to twisted notions of justice that made a human being a form of
property.

Conclusion
Care theory has the potential to reframe how we approach the social good that is justice. It can
alter the presumptions and applications of social justice. For example, our keynote speaker,
Margaret Urban Walker integrates ethics and psychology to develop the notion of “moral repair”
in response to acts of injustice within the scope of restorative justice. Rather than disengaged
individuals, Walker begins with the assumption of the community members existing in a moral
relationship to one another that entails some shared values without eliding diversity. Walker
advocates a more active and engaged form of justice because it is funded by this moral
relationship rather than coercively or abstractly imposed. Because the norm is the morally
related community, violations or crimes damage the relationships and must be repaired in order
to restore the moral community. In this manner, Walker has offered a new vision that does not
negate the value of justice but reconceives it to account for caring. Walker is not alone. Recent
work has witnessed feminists and nonfeminists such as Slote

It may be that care theory simply gives us permission to think differently: to start from the
particular and move to thematic understandings of justice and back again.
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